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Abstract 
This paper describes a novel approach to profiling 
phishillg emails based on the combination of multi-
ple independent clusterillgs of the email documents. 
Eat:h clustering is motivated by a natural representa-
tion of the emails. A data set of 2048 phishing em ails 
provided by a major Australian financial institution 
was pre-processed to extract features describing the 
textual content , hyperlinks and orthographic struc-
ture of the emails. Independent clusterings using dif-
ferent techniques were performed on each representa-
tion, and these clusterings were then ensembled using 
a variety of consensus functions. This paper concen-
trates on using several clustering approaches to de-
termine the most likely number of phishing groups 
and explores ways in which individual and combined 
results relate. The approach suggests a number of 
phishing groups and the structure of the approach 
can aid the development of profiles based on the in-
dividual clusters. The actual profiling is not carried 
out in this paper. 
Keywords: Clustering, Phishing, Graph Partitioning, 
Cluster ensembles, Profiling, Consensns functions . 
1 Introduction 
Phishing can be defined as a scam by which an email 
user is duped into revealing personal or confiden-
tial information which the scammer can use illicitly. 
Phishing attacks use both social engineering and tech-
nical subterfuge to steal personal identity data and 
financial account credentials. Phishing is one of the 
fastest growing scams on the Internet. Theexclu-
sive mot.ivation of phishcrs is financial gain. Phishers 
employ a variety of different techniques from spoofed 
links to malware (keyloggers) to DNS Cache Poison-
ing (Stewart 2003) (which is also known as Pharrning) 
to lure the unsuspected user into divulging their per-
sonal information (Emigh 2005). 
A spoofed email is usually sent to a large group 
of people from an address that appears to be from 
their bank or some other legitimate institution. The 
phishing email is typically worded to instil a sense 
of urgency and to elicit an immediate response from 
the recipient, e.g., "verify your account details or your 
account will be closed". The hoax email also contains 
a link to an online form that is branded to look exactly 
like the organization website . The form has to be 
filled in using sensitive information like passwords, 
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user account details and credit card details. Until 
recenlly most phishers used the names of financial 
institutions to deceive people into giving away their 
account information. They now also use the names 
of other organizations like eBay, PayPal and even the 
Australian Taxation Office. 
Most technical approaches to phishing so far aim 
to detect and block or highlight phishing activities ei-
ther in the original email or when the website is con-
tacted. Examples include the work of Fette, Sadeh 
and Tomasic (2007), Wu et al (2006) , Juels et al 
(2006) , Chandrasekaran et al (2006), Chau (2005), 
and Jakobsson (2005). For example, the eBay Tool-
bar is a browser plllgin that eBay offers to its cus-
tomers, primarily to help them keep track of auction 
sites. The tool bar has a feature called Account Guard 
that monitors the domain names that users visit and 
provide warning in the fonn of a coloured tab on the 
toolbar. The tab is usually grey but it turns green if 
the user is on eBay or the PayPal site. It turns red 
if the user is on a site that is detected as spoofed by 
eBay. These approaches aim to protect an individual 
user from the ad ions of phishers, but they fail to ad-
dress the issue of protecting the broader community. 
Therefore here we propose the development of a 
complementary set of technology with the aim of 
profiling the behaviour of phishers, thereby allow-
ing t.racking, prediction and possibly identification of 
these illegal operators. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 gives the bat:kground of profiling. Section 3 
provides the details of 3 groups of c1usterings accord-
ing to different feature types. Section 4 describes dif-
ferent types of consensus functions. Section 6 shows 
the evaluation methodologies, ami experimental re-
sults are shown and discussed in Section 7. Finally 
Section 8 concludes the work and highlights a direc-
tion for the future research. 
2 Profiling 
'Profiling is a data surveillance technique which is lit-
tle understood and ill-documented, but increasingly 
used. It means generating suspects or prospects from 
within a large population, and involves inferring a 
set of characteristics of a particular class of person 
frolll past experience' (Roger 1993). In (Roger 1993), 
different data surveillance tet:hniques have been sur-
veyed; like front-end verification and data matching. 
As well as different problems needing t.o be tackled 
in this area, it has been shown that profiling data 
requires different sets of measures. Take the defini-
tion of profiling as in (Roger 1993): 'Profiling is a 
technique whereby a set of characteristics of a partic-
ular class of person is inferred from past experience, 
and data-holdings are then searched for individuals 
for close fit to that set of characteristics.' Further-
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mure numerous putential areas fur the use uf profil-
ing have been identified. These include patient.s who 
have a likelihood of suffering from certain diseases, 
students having potential artistic talents, identifying 
customers buying patterns and mauy others. 
Forensic Psychology is used by Webb (2007) to 
identify perpetrator(s) of a crime based on the nature 
of the uflclll;e COlIlIllitted and its mude uf operatiull 
(Alison et al. 2003), (Castle and Hensley 2002). This 
leads to determination of various aspects of criminal 
psychology before, during and after the crime is com-
mitted. 
In this paper, we follow the same trend set up by 
these studies, to profile phishing em ails based on t,heir 
structural characteristics, their content and informa-
tion about their likely origin. The approach in the 
first instance is to try to firmly identify the emails 
that are similar across all of these types of character-
istics and assume that these correspond t,o different 
phishing groups with certain modus operandi. The 
next stage of the work (not reported in this paper), 
will be to construct profiles of these groups by iden-
tifying the link structure, orthographic structure and 
content character of each group. 
3 Clustering techniques 
The 2048 emails used in our experiments are a sub-
set of a much larger corpus, obtained from a major 
Australian bank. These are email;; gathered by their 
information security group over a span of 5 months 
in 2006, and were identified as phishing emails. Most 
of the elllails are about 1026 characters in length and 
have both text and hyperlink content embedded in 
them. Some of them contain HTML script, including 
tables, images, links, and other structures that can be 
useful in differentiating the emails. Hence, defining 
the modus operandi of the individual phishing group 
or activity. 
There are a number of features which could be 
used as a basis for comparison and clustering of these 
email documents. These include the actual text con-
tent displayed to the user, the textual structure of 
this content, the nature of the hyperlinks embedded 
within the message, or the use of HTML features such 
as images, tables and forms. 
An approach is to represent each email document 
in terms of this set of features, and then apply a clus-
tering algorithm to these feature vectors. However, 
there are two drawbacks to this simplistic approach. 
Firstly, the nature of the features is varied, some fea-
tures are numeric whilst others are binary or cate-
gorical. Thus combining the features together in a 
single clustering algorithm is problematic. Secondly, 
clustering algorithms always produce a set of clusters, 
even if there is no evidence of any underlying struc-
ture in the data. In our case there are nu ground-truth 
labels to use as a basis for testing the clustering re-
sults, as the actual source for any of the emails is 
unknown. Therefore, it is important that methods 
to validate the clusters produced by the system are 
found. 
Similar issues have previously been observed in the 
context of clustering of high-dilllellsional data sets 
such as those used in bioinformatics. Researchers 
working in these areas have prop used the use of clus-
ter ensembles. Several indepelldellt clusterings are 
performed based on different subsets of the complete 
feature vector. These are then combined together in a 
cluster ensemble to furm a final, CUll;;ensus clustering 
(Strehl and Ghosh 2002, Topchy et al. 2003, Fern and 
Brodley 2004). If pairs uf objects (i.e. emails) are ob-
served to be commonly grouped together across all of 
the independent clusterillgs, this provides increased 
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confidence tha.t the dustering indicates a genuine re-
lationship between the objects rather than just ran-
dom noise. In (Fern and Brodley 2004) the different 
fea.ture sets used in each clustering were random sub-
selections or projections of the original feature vector. 
In our approach, we have instead chosen to use three 
groups of features which reflect different characteris-
tics of the underlying data: 
• the text content which is shown to the email's 
reader 
• a characterisation of the hyper links in the email 
• the orthographic features of the email 
3.1 Text clustering 
Perhaps the most obvious feature to use in profiling 
ern ails is the textual content displayed to the reader. 
For the emails in the data set this textual content was 
encoded in a number of ways. They included plain 
text, as HTML-formatted text, or as an embedded 
image. Therefore pre-processing was necessary to ex-
tract the text content from each email, by stripping 
away HTML tags and other structural information 
and by applying optical character recognition to the 
embedded images. 
With the text extracted, this was then converted 
into a numerical feature vector for each email by 
computillg the TF/IDF weight algorithm, shown in 
equation (1). 
. 10g(N) 
Wij = tf . 'Ldf = iti . ~
n = total number of em ails 
fli = frequency of term i in document k 
dh = number documents containing di 
(1) 
Each email was then represented as a vector of 
its term weights and these vectors were clustered 
using the k-means algorithm. 
3.2 Hyperlink clustering 
We grouped together emails based on similar tokens 
found within the fake hyper link structure. Many of 
these hyperlinks contained similar names, this was 
especially apparent for their directory naming con-
ventions. We looked for directory or file names that 
were obscure, frequently occurring and had names 
that were related to banking. We ensured that no le-
gitimate directories or file names were included, as all 
legitimate bank hyperlinks were removed before the 
clustering process. All non legitimate and frequently 
occurring bank related names/tokens were used as a 
seed for each cluster. Any em ails containing absent 
links, links with no directories, IP only or hex only 
links or links containing none of these key tokens were 
clustered together into the "other" cluster. Shown in 
Table 1 are the directory and file names used to build 
each cluster. The follow'ing is a more detailed descrip-
tion of the hyperlink clustering procedure. 
3.2.1 Extraction of links 
1. Firstly, we extracted all links from the 2048 
emails. 
2. We then pre-processed the links by removing all 
surrounding tags and script information and any 
other periphery not directly related to the file or 
name structure of the link itself. 
3. Next we removed all legitimate links belonging 
to any bank. 
4. The links were then broken up into their Proto-
col, Host name, multi level domains and multi 
level directory components. All protocol, host 
name and top level domain name identifiers were 
removed during this process. These include such 
things as "http:", "www", "edu", "au" and all oth-
ers. 
5. All remaining tokens found in the second level 
domain and all other directory levels were then 
stored in a binary tree along with the number 
of emails they were found in and their overall 
corpus frequency count. 
6. Any emails that had no tokens, due to absent 
links, legitimate bank links only or had no words 
present in the link, were automatically clustered 
into cluster 10, "Others" and didn't contribute 
further to the clustering process. 
3.2.2 Building the clusters 
This was a partially manual process where we looked 
over the stored tokens, taking into account the names 
used, their overall frequency and the number of emails 
that they appeared in. With the possibility of such 
a large number of words, we ignored all words with 
a frequency of 1 % of the total number of emails, 
and were not bank related. The exception however 
was the "moreinfo.html" and "wumoreinfo.html" file 
name. Words that may of occurred many times, but 
were found only in a few emails were also excluded 
as a grouping could not be formed from them. Large 
frequency words such as "index", "netbank" or "big-
pond" , were excluded as they were not unique enough 
to belong to just one group. However names such as 
"index2_files", "nabib" and ".verify"were kept due to 
their higher obscurity and number of emails they were 
found in. Some examples are: 
nabib 
• http://blog.co.tz/nabib/ 
• https://ib.national.com.au/nabib/help/ 
• http://startherefilms.com/nabib/ 
• http://evolk.info/nabib/ 
• http://fioridanetscrvices.com/nabib/ 
• http://www.jr.ac.th/nabib/ 
/rl/? 
• http://www.netbank.commbank.com.au.netbank. 
rim2s.biz/rl/c/ 
• http://citibusinessonline.da-us.citi bank. corn. 
dllinfo.tv /rl/cb/ 
• http://www.barclays.co.uk.customercare.goto. 
cOllfpr.st/rl/b/ 
• http://www.national.com.au.vdq6270z. 
manicte.com/rl/n/ 
• http://www.barclays.co.uk.customercare.goto. 
mabberas.com/rl/b/ 
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Table 1: Number of emails in initial groups found 
~yperliiik Keyword Number of 
emails 
/nabib 289 
j.verifyacc/ , j.ver/,j.verify/ 22 
/index2_files/ 98 · 
/anb2/ 6 
/rl/? / 765 
7netbanKl or /netbank/bankmain/ 319 
cbusol 41 
/ .national.com.au 81 
moremfo.htm,wumoremto.htm ~ 
"Others 41~ 
With the seeding tokens now found, all remaining 
ernails not belonging to the "Others" group were then 
allocated to the cluster containing their nominated 
token. 
Shown in table 1 are the nominated fake link to-
kens (Cluster seeds) as well as the number of enmils 
contained within each cluster. The "Others" row 
shows the remaining number of emails that didn't 
contain viable hyperlink tokens. 
3.3 Orthographic clustering 
Phishing emails usually contain multimedia type in-
formation to help overcome phishing filters and lure 
the unsuspecting recipient. This includes images and 
text, where the text information lllay contain plain 
text, markup languages and styles, scripts, URLs and 
so on. The images may contain logos or a mock up of 
a bank or an institution's web page with altered text. 
However, the infonnation cannot be recognized by a 
system directly, rather it needs to be characterized 
according to the needs of the system. 
Phishing emails are largely similar in content. 
Therefore, we believe that orthographic features a~·e 
important in such an application. The orthographic 
features mainly consist of style characteristics that 
are used to convey the role of words, sentences or 
sections that describe the email content. 
Since an email body is often loose in structure, 
parsing email content is more difficult than parsing 
the header part of the email. For the present we have 
defin('d the features manually hased on observation. 
The orthographic features collected in our system are 
described as the following: 
1. size of the text and html body of an email. 
2. whether an email has text content l . 
3. number of visible links in an email. 
4. whether a visual link is directed to the same hy-
perlink in an email. 
5. whether an email contains a greeting line. 
6. whether an email contains a signature at the end. 
7. whether an email contains HTML content. 
8. whether an email contains scripts. 
9. whether an email contains tables. 
10. number of images in an email. 
11. number of hyperlinks in an email. 
1 Some phishing crnails contain only images 
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12. whether an email contains a form. 
13. number of fake tags in a email2 . 
A high level description of the feature extrac-
tion and clustering process can be seen in Figure 3. 
Features arc collected according to featnres defined 
above, but not all the features are informative. There-
fore, the most informative features are selected using 
a learning model and clustering is carr.i ed out. Both 
of these tasks are done iterat.ively using t he Modified 
Global k-means algorithm (Bagirov and Mardaneh 
2006, Bagirov 2008). A selection process conducts 
a search for a best feature subset and then uses Mod-
ified Global k-means (MGkm) for the evaluation of 
the current feature subset. This is run repeatedly 
on the phishing emails using various feature subsets 
and various tolerance values for MGkm. The per-
formance is evaluated by MGkm objective function 
values on the various feature subsets, where the sub-
set with the lowest objective function value is chosen 
as the iterated feature subset on which the induction 
algorithm runs. 
Clljltl ... Fundj""VS Tollrin~1I 
"" 
---- ........ ----- - - -- ~ _ .............. -- .. - -- -- - .. - - ----------- -
DDI O~ our ~ (113. 0 1)11 0 1 
Figure 1: Objective function values vs tolerance val-
ues 
Figure 2: Objective function values vs the number of 
clusters 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the ob-
jective function values(l/;,!) and tolerance values (Vi) 
2Somctimcs phishers use ill formed HTML or embedded fake 
tags in a.u a.ttempt t.o elude phishing filters 
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We calculated v.,! over a range of Vi from 0 to 0.1 
and discovered Vol achieves stable value of 45 when 
Vi ~ 0.05. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship be-
tweell Vol and the number of clusters. The graph 
shows that when Vol is 45, the number of clusters is 
9. Together these figures indicate that a good cluster-
ing (a good balance between objective function val-
ues, tolerance and the number of clusters) of this data 
set is achieved with 9 clusters. 
Fellures Cokcdon J 
lnduoed Fe.a\ure Subsd 
PhlshlngE .. II, 
PhlshlngEmalls ~~ ~u,,~onJ·- i PtrfolJlWlnce I Fe.alure EllimIIlon I SUbiei I I UodiIlolGIObl~_J 
P~E""II. 
ffif,t1::~9t'~fl Vedor GMefilion ¥Alh Selected Fealur~ 
Figure 3: The feature selection and clustering process 
using orthographic features 
4 Consensus functions 
Several consensus functions have been proposed for 
fanning consensus clusterillgs from an ensemble of 
independent clusterings (Strehl and Ghosh 2002, 
Topchy et al. 2003, Fern and Brodley 2004). Given 
a data set X = {Xl,X2, ... ,xn } where n is the total 
number of instances Xl, 11 = {rr!, rr2, ... , rr·r} is a clus-
tering ensemble on X where r is the total number of 
clusterings and rri = {c1, c~, ... , ck} where c; corre-
sponds to the cluster j in the clusterillg rri and Ki is 
the total number of clusters formed in the clustering 
rri. For each rri we have Ukci = X. 
Consensus clusterings are usually used on a single 
data set. with different clusterings produced by: 
• the different subsets of the whole feature set, or 
• the different initial parameters in some clustering 
algorithms. 
In t.his work, we use consensus functions on differ-
ent clusterings obtained using the different features 
already discussed in Section 3. We utilize four consen-
sus functions described by Fern and Brodley (2004). 
• Instance-Based Graph Formulation (IBGF): 
This method constructs a graph in which in-
stances are represented by nodes and their con-
nections are modelled as weighted edges given 
the association between the instances. The 
weight on the edge between the instances Xl and 
Xm in lB G F is calculated using the formula in 
equation (2). 
1 r 
w(l, m) = - L I(gq(xz) = gq(Xm)) 
r q=l 
I(arg) = 1; if arg=true 
I(arg) = 0; if arg=false 
gq(arg) = 4; where arg E ch 
(2) 
., 
IBGF makes use of a graph partitioning algo-
rithm3 to partition the graph according to the 
edge weight.s. The final dust.ering includes dus-
ters corresponding to each graph partition. 
• Cluster-Based Graph Fommlation (CBGF): This 
method constructs a graph with the clusters as 
graph nodes and the similarity of the clusters as 
weights on the edges. The edge weight between 
two clusters Ci and Cj in CBGF is calculated us-
ing the Jaccard Measure in equation (3). 
( .. ) ICincjl W~J = ---
, ICi U Cjl 
(3) 
A graph partitioning algorithm is then used to 
eliminate the lowest weighted edges, thereby en-
suring that clusters which share a large number 
of instances will be grouped together in the fi-
nal consensus clustering. Following partitioning, 
each instance is assigned 1.0 the final dust.er in 
which it most commonly occurs. 
• Hybrid Bipa'f'tite Graph Formulation (HBGF): 
This method constructs a bipartite graph with 
two types of nodes, clusters and instances. There 
is an edge between each pair of nodesj however, 
the weights of the edges between the nodes of the 
same type are O. The edge weight between an in-
stance Xl and a cluster Ci is 1 if Xl E C'i and is 
o otherwise4 . The graph partitioning algorithm 
partitions both clusters and instances simultane-
ously and the final clustering is formed according 
to the partitions of instances. 
• K-Means Clustering Punction (KMCF): This 
lllethod was first proposed by Topchy et al. 
(2003) and uses the standard K-Means clusteriug 
algorithm to produce the final clustering. KMCF 
first creates a set of Hew features for each cluster-
ing rri. It adds J{i binary features to the new set 
of features. Each of the new features correspond 
to a cluster in rri. The total number of new fea-
tures is equal to the total number of the clusters 
in II. For each instance Xl EX, the feature cor-
responding to Ci is 1 if Xl E Ci and is 0 otherwise. 
The new features are standardize to have zero 
mean and then the standard K-Means is applied 
to the features to create the final clustering. 
5 Background to the experiments 
Described in Section 3 are the text, links and ortho-
graphic structural clustering techniques. Each tech-
nique individually assigned each instance of an email 
to a cluster or profile according to its clustering cri-
teria and feature set. Hence, capturing specific but 
different aspects of the data, where a single cluster-
ing technique alone could not. Our aim therefore is 
to combine these clusterings together to 
• reinforce the intersecting information 
• include information not shared between the three 
techniques 
• find the best fitting number of profiles. 
3In our implementations, we utilize the METIS graph partition-
ing module developed by Karypis and Kumar (1998). 
4 We set the weights between same node types to 1 and if an 
instance belongs to a cluster we set the weight to 1000. This is 
because of the implementation limitations in METIS where weights 
cannot be O. 
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Shown in Section 4 is an explanation of the 
four consensus functions CBGF, HBGF, IBGF and 
KMCF. In terms of their application most work to 
date has been dOlle on cluster ensembling of large data 
sets. The main focus here has been in breaking large 
data sets into smaller subsets using such techniques as 
random projections or random sub-sampling. Then, 
clustering algorithms could work on the smaller' more 
manageable subsets of the original data set. The con-
sensus functions would then be used to recombine 
thc:;e multiple clusterings so that a final clustering 
could be found. This work is shown in (Strehl and 
Ghosh 2002, Fern and Brodley 2004), where a com-
parison of all the consensus functions is undertaken on 
multiple data sets. Their results show that on average 
the HBGF and IBGF consensus functions improved 
the most when increasing both the number of projec-
tions and projections within the ensembles. The other 
two consensus functions performed less favourably un-
der these conditions. However, these results were also 
dependent on the data set, and both the CBGF and 
KMCF consensus functions performed better than the 
other two on certain data sets. 
Our application of the:;e consensus functions is 
very different. We use different feat.ure sets and clus-
tering algorithms to find the clusterings. We also 
use a much smaller number in our ensemble, using 
only three technique clusterings. In (Fern and Brod-
ley 2004) consensus functions are being compared in 
the use of many applications. One such application 
is Robust Centralized Clustering (RCC). Here, they 
look at a fixed number of clust.cringsj they have access 
to the dataset's features and use ten different but di-
verse clustering algorithms. This application is very 
similar to ours. The authors also show that a CBGF 
type consensus function performed very well in such 
an application. Unfortunately the KMCF consensus 
fUllction was not examined in this study. 
The culmination of the clusterings by the three 
techniques into one final clustering via the four con-
sensus fUllctions leaves us with at least four final clus-
terings. However, the number of cluster labels given 
to the consensus functions from the individual cluster-
ing techniques could vary between any or all of them. 
For example, in our case both the t ext and link clus-
tering techniques have ten cluster labels, whereas the 
structural orthographic technique has nine. The con-
sensus functions do not automatically determine what 
final number of duster labels is the most appropriate. 
This means that we must specify the number of clus-
ter labels for the final consensus clustering results. 
From our previous examination of the fake links 
represented in the emails, an approximation of ten 
profiles was found. Furthermore, results from the 
structural orthographic technique shown in Sec-
tion 3 using the Global Modified k-means algorithm 
(Bagirov 2008) reports nine clusters as an optimal 
number of clusters. We assumed then, that around 
10 clusters could best partition the data set in terms 
of the number of profiles. With that in mind we set 
about establishing thi:; final approximate number of 
clusters. In doing so, we casted a wider net by giving 
the consensus functions a range of 5 to 15 clusterings. 
This would allow us to evaluate five final cluster con-
figurations either side of our initial assumption. 
6 Evaluation Criteria 
Evaluating the best final consensus clustering from 5 
to 15 was a non-trivial process. To give us an indi-
cation of the "most correct" final clustering we em-
ployed the use of three Illeasures, these were, Normal-
ized Mutual information(NMI), purity and the num-
ber of edge cuts. We compared each final consensus 
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clustering 5 to 15 to each of the individual technique 
clusterings by comparing their intersections and rela-
tive information using the NMI and purity measures. 
We also compared the number of edge cuts given by 
the consensus functions from each final clllst.ering. We 
surmised that the best final clustering would have the 
following: 
1. A relatively com;istent NMI value close to 1 when 
comparing the three given individual clustering 
techniques against all of the final consensus clus-
terings. 
2. A high but consistent two way purity value. That 
is, a value similar when comparing both the indi-
vidual technique t.o the final clustering and vice 
versa. We again would expect to have a value 
close to 1, to show that there is a stroHg intersec-
tion between both the individual technique clus-
tering and the final consensus clustering. 
3. A relatively low number of edge cuts given the 
number of clusters. This value is compared to all 
other clusterings within its respective consensus 
function as well as within the other consensus 
functions. 
6.1 Purity 
Purity measures the quality of a clustering solution 
by determining the number of poillts in the intersec-
tion of allocated clusters and predetermined labelled 
classes. 
Let k be the number of clusters found by a hard 
partitioning clustering algorithm in data set D. Let 
ICjl be the size of cluster Cj and ICjlclass = i be the 
Humber of points of class i assigned to cluster j. Then 
the purity of cluster j is given by 
. 1 
P'UT'ttY(Cj) = IGjl mrx(lcjlclass=i) (4) 
The overall purity for cluster Cj, j = 1, ... , k, is 
expressed as a weighted sum of the k individual puri-
ties 
k 
. () '" I Cj I . () ( ) punty Cj tot = 8 TDTP'unty Cj 5 
However, the purity measure shown here is asym-
metrical. Let Iclassil be the size of class Ci and 
Iclassilclust = j be the number of points of cluster j 
assigned to class i. Find PUTitY(Ci) and pUTitY(Ci)tot. 
Then puTity(cj )tot f pUTity( Ci )tot unless the points 
are sYlllllletrically distributed between both the re-
spective class i and cluster j. 
It is therefore a relative measure that depends 
on the order in which the multi labelled set of in-
stances are measured. Since we are the ones attempt-
ing to label these instances we assume that we do not 
have the actual classification labels. We therefore, 
take puTity(techniquepj )tot of clustering technique p 
where p is an integer mapped to each technique type 
"links", "text" and "structural orthographic" against 
final consellsus function m where m = 1, .. ,,15, the 
number of clusters found by each respective consen-
sus function. We then find pUTity(consensusmi)tot 
against each techniquep and pUTity(techniqucpj)tot 
against consensusm . Leaving us with two purity mea-
sures comparing a two way symmetric intersection 
between the respective final consensus and individ-
ual technique clustering. Allowing us to measure the 
difference between the two. Hence, the smaller t.he 
distance between the two purity measures, the better 
the intersection between the two clusterings. 
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6.2 Normalized Mutual information 
Mutual Information is a symmetrical measure that 
takes into account both the intersection of the two 
;ids of clusterings as well as quantifying the statistical 
information found in both distributions, see (Cover 
and Thomas 1991). Though it provides a good in-
dication of the shared information between a pair of 
clusterings, it is desirable as with purity, to have a 
normalized ver~ion of Mutual Information with val-
ues between [0 - IJ. 
Let X and Y be random variables described by the 
consensus function clusterings A(i) and the technique 
clusterings A(j) where i = 1 ... p and j = 1 ... m, 
with k(i) and k(j) number of clusters respectively. Let 
J(X, Y) denote mutual information betweeu two ran-
dom variables X and Y and H(X) and H(Y) denote 
the entropies of both variable X and Y respectively. 
In the literature several normalizations exist. We 
chose the version of NMI found in (Strehl and Ghosh 
2002, Fern and Bradley 2004) as it has been shown to 
successfully measure consensus functions against var-
ious types of ensembles. It uses the geometric mean 
of H(X) and H(Y) to norrnalize the mutual informa-
tion see (Strehl and Ghosh 2002, Fern and Brodley 
2004) for a detailed description and a proof. 
N M J(X Y) = J(X, Y) (6) 
, JH(X)H(Y) 
The NMI measure gives a best result when the 
value is close to one. This happens when the intersec-
tion of both A (i) and A (j) is strang and both entropies 
H(X) and H(Y) have similar values. Thus, NMI is 
a very good measure as it shows how much infonna-
tion has been preserved and how closely the clusters 
overlap between the final consensus results compared 
to the individual technique clusters. 
An average or maximum of NMI values were used 
in (Strehl and Ghosh 2002, Fern and Bradley 2004) 
across the cluster ensembles created by the random 
projections or sub-sampling when compared against 
the final consensus clusterillgs. Since we have only 
three techniques this evaluation would be of no ad-
vantage to us. Therefore we decided to compare each 
individual technique against all of the final consensus 
clusterings individually, using a balance measure be-
tween the two purities and NMI to guide us to the 
best consensus clustering. 
6.3 Number of edge-cuts 
The Metis Graph partitioning software is used to cre-
ate the partitions for the consensus functions shown 
in Section 4. The algorithm used, found in (Karypis 
and Kumar 1998), computes a k-way partition of a 
graph by minimizing the number of edge-cuts sub-
ject to a number of vertex balancing constraints. The 
edge-cut value is the total number of edges being cut 
in order to ohtain that final number of c\ust.erings. 
We use this measure by dividing the number of 
edge-cuts by the number final clusters given to the 
conseniSUS functions. As we have a range 5 to 15 fi-
nal clusterings, we would expect the number of edge-
cuts/number of final clusters to decrease across the 16 
clusterings. It is natural that when asking the con-
sensus function algorithm to produce a larger number 
of final clusterings, it would then make more cuts in 
order to create more partitions. However, because the 
algorithm works on minimizing the number of cuts, 
a number of cuts that is much greater than the pre-
vious cluster's cut would indicate a stronger cohesion 
amongst that partition. 
We are then looking for a value that is considerably 
smaller than the clusters around it, as this shows that 
the number of cuts has decreased significantly. 
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7 Results 
7.1 Comparing the individual techniques 
We compared each individual clustering against one 
another to find their NMI, puri ty and individual en-
tropy. As shown in Table 2, the three techniques con-
tained roughly the same amount of information as 
they all displayed an entropy of between 0.62 - 0.74. 
Table 3 shows the results of comparing the links 
and text content clusterings using both the NMI and 
purity measures. It can be seen that the links and text 
content clustering has the strongest intersection, as all 
the NMI and purity values are high. Leading us to 
the conclusion that both the links and text clustering 
techniques have captured similar information frolll 
the data set. However, Table 3 also shows that the 
structural orthographic clustering result compared to 
the other two techniques gave a much poorer NMI 
value. Furthermore, Table 3 also shows a big gap be-
tween the two orthographic purity measures, as well 
as these values being small. It is also worth not-
ing that the results from comparing the Orthographic 
technique to the other two techniques were compar-
atively similar. This leads us to the conclusion that 
the structural orthographic technique has captured 
mostly different information compared to the other 
two techniques. This may also be the reason why, 
when comparing the three techniques to the final con-
sensus clusterings that the Orthographic technique, 
again had poorer results compared to the other tech-
Iliques. 
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Table 2: Entropy of the individual clustering tech-
niques 
7.2 Comparison of consensus functions 
Figures 4,5, 6 and 7 show the results of NMI and the 
purity values for each final consensus cluster 5 to 15 
compared to each of the three techniques for the four 
consensus functions. When comparing the results 
shown in these graphs we can see a lot of variation in 
each of the different consensus functions. The CBGF 
consensus function shown in Figure 4 and KMCF con-
sensus function shown in Figure 7 report the best re-
sults. They show consistently higher NMI and purity 
values when compared to the IBGF consensus func-
tion shown in Figure 5 and HBGF consensus function 
shown in Figure 6. The other noticeable difference is 
that there is much less variation in the difference in 
the purity values of the CBGF and KMCF graphs 
compared to the IBGF and HBGF graphs. 
At closer inspection, we see that both CBGF and 
Table 3: NMI and purity results from comparing clus-
ters techniques against one another 
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IS 
KMCF consensus function graphs show the highest 
NMI values for both the links and text content clus-
tering techniques compared to results shown for the 
structural orthographic technique. Both the IBGF 
and HBGF consensus functions, shown in Figures 5 
and 6 respectively report the worse results. Both con-
sensus function:> give the smallest NMI values com-
pared to the CBGF and KMCF consensus function 
results. They also show that there are bigger differ-
ences in the two purity values again compared to the 
CBGF and KMCF consensus graph results. 
BaBed on the results from these graphs we can rule 
out any of the final consensus dusterings produced 
by the IBGF and HBGF consensus functions. This 
leaves us with the clusterings obtained by the CBGF 
and KMCF consensus fUllctions. When comparing 
the results of both the CBGF and KMCF consen-
sus functions shown in Figures 4 and 7 respectively, 
we can see that the NMI values given in the CBGF 
consensus graph for both links and text/TFIDF tech-
niques gives higher values at their respective peaks. 
The only exception is shown in the orthographic tech-
nique graph of the KMCF consensus function. The 
results shown for both the CBGF and KMCF con-
sensus functions are favourable and warrant further 
exploring. 
7.3 Evaluating the best final clustering 
We can utilize both the NMI and purity Illeasures 
to evaluate the best individual clustering. An ideal 
result [or the final clustering would indicate a NMI 
value close to 1, both purity values would also be 
close to 1, but with a similar value. Balanced purity 
shown in equation (7) fulfils this criteria. It gives a 
value output in the range of 0 to 3 for each individual 
clustering technique, where 3 would be the best pos-
sible intersection and 0 the least. Our aim therefore, 
would be to find the largest balanced purity value 
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given across the three clustering techniques for each 
of the 5 to 15 final consensus clusterings of each COIl-
sensus function. 
We take the sum over the three clustering tech-
niques for each of the 5 to 15 individual clusterings 
respectively. We then find the maximum value across 
all of the 5 to 15 clusterings for all four consensus 
functions, in order to find the overall maximum value. 
This maximum value would then give the best number 
of clusters for the best consensus function technique 
that would in theory best capture our data set. 
We denote p'UTity(c;)tot as P'UT(Ci) and 
p'Urity(cj)tot as P'UT(Cj) , refer to equation (5). 
balanced purity = (NMI -lp'Ur(ci) - p'Ur(Cj) I 
+pur(ci) + p'Ur(cj)) (7) 
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the results of equa-
tion (7) on both the CBGF and KMCF consensus 
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functions against the three clustering techniques. The 
top values in the graph are the summation of the lower 
three sets of values that correspond to each of the in-
dividual clustering techniques. It can be seen, that 
in both of these graphs that the largest value found 
from the sllmmation on the three techniques was the 
final clustering 9. 
Figure 8 shows the number of cuts divided by the 
number of final conscnsus clusterings for the CBGF 
consensus function. As mentioned earlier, you would 
expect a decreasing graph with little fluctuations or 
pits in it. However, as shown in Figure 8 there are 
two significant dips, these are at final consensus clus-
tering 7 and 9. This means that the number cuts for 
these two clusterings were considerably smaller than 
the cuts made in earlier and in later clusterings_ This 
then leads us to the conclusion that both of these clus-
terings show the most stability in their partitions. 
We can see from the results that thc final clus-
tering of 9 from the CBGF consensus function is the 
most consistent at gaining the highest values in terms 
of all our measurements_ Though, other clusters have 
also presented comparatively good results, especially 
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within both the CBGF and KMCF consensus func-
tions the clustering of!J appeared to be the most con-
sistent ov(,ral1. 
Finally, it is worth highlighting that the work un-
dertaken in Section 3.3 found that a good clustering, 
(a good balance between objective function values, 
tolerances and the number of clusters) of the data 
set was achieved with 9 clusters. Refer to Figures 1 
and 2. 
I 8 Conclusion 
Phishing is carried out by multiple groups of people 
over the internet. In this study we were provided 
with the artefacts of phishillg attacks on financial in-
stitutions in Australia by a major Australian Bank. 
The artefacts of this phishing activity are emails that 
have been identified and classified as phishing emails. 
This work has used different clustering techniques to 
identify the groups involved in phishing. The main 
problems with emails is how to represent them as ob-
jects that can be clustered. Our approach has been to 
use three different representations of the emails, text 
content as determined by words, link content as de-
termined by the hidden links in the email and the or-
thographic structure as determined by the features in 
Section 3.3. These were all natural representations of 
the emails, however a fourth facet of phishing emails 
is the scripting, but this will be part of our future 
work. 
The features from each of the three feature spaces 
mentioned above were selected and individual clus-
tering algorithms were used to determine clusterings 
based on each of these representations. Each of these 
clusterings provided different information, not all sug-
gested a number of phishing groups. However the 
orthographic approach using tlw Modified Global k-
means algorithm and some analysis of the objective 
function (clustering function) suggested 9 groups. 
In order to utilise the evidence from the three 
clustering approaches, they were ensembled using the 
three clustering consensus approaches as described in 
Section 4. Two of these graphing functions, CBGF 
and KMCF provided interesting results when the edge 
cut graphs were examined, again suggesting 9 as the 
likely number of final clusters. The NMI and purity 
measures between these consensus functions and the 
three clusterings of the text, links and orthographil: 
techniques also demonstrated maximum mutual in-
formation and balance purity around 9 clusters. This 
can be clearly seen by the sum in Figures 9 and 10. 
Whilst not conclusive, this paper has explored 
clustering approaches and ensemble clustering ap-
proaches to provide information about the number 
of phishing groups. This, through the different in-
dividual clustering representations provides informa-
tion about the profile of these groups. This paper has 
concentrated on assembling the strongest evidence for 
identifying a specific number phishing groups. 
The issue of identifying and articulating the pro-
file of these particular groups will be the subject of a 
further paper. A model will be built using the clus-
terings found in this paper, where the separate infor-
mation about the modus operandi of the groups can 
be brought together. Other future work will include 
a reality check of our results with expert views of the 
number and nature of phishing groups and testing our 
model on other data sets. 
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